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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this dispute and as
to the applicable Utah Statutes and Administrative Rules that may apply to this case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondents do not dispute Petitioner's Statement of Issues and Standards
of Review. However, Respondents do rephrase both issues on appeal in an effort
to change the issues. We do not believe this is proper. All parts of their Brief
relating to their alternative issues are irrelevant and should be discounted on appeal.
This is not a complicated case, despite Respondent's attempts to obfuscate the
issues. At their simplest and purest form the only issues properly raised before this
Court are:
Issuel: Did the Petitioner have a right to withdraw her Application for Hearing
prior to Hearing? Respondents in their Brief do not even list this as an issue
although it goes to the very heart of the dispute before this Court.
This is clearly a question of law where appellate review gives no deference
to the agency's determination, because the appellate court has the power and duty
to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.
Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). Such an Issue is
reviewed for correctness. LaSal Oil Co. V. Department of Environmental Quality.
843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Issue 2: Did the AL J and the Appeals Board of the Labor Commission abuse
1

their discretion in dismissing this matter with prejudice and also by failing to set aside
Petitioner's default? Respondents attempt to break this simple, straightforward issue
into two different issues, rephrased and recharacterized in a manner contrary to that
set out in Petitioner's Docketing Statement and in her Brief. This is also an
unfortunate but nevertheless inaccurate attempt to cloud the issues and recast them
in a manner different that the issues on Appeal raised by the Petitioner.
This issue as properly and succinctly stated by Petitioner is a question of law
which is reviewed under a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard. Sierra Club v. Utah
Solid Hazardous Waste Control Board. 964 P.2d 335, 344 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
The Respondents filed neither a Petition for Review nor a Cross-Appeal. They
further did not file a Docketing statement listing any additional issues on Appeal.
Their belated attempt to rephrase and/or raise new issues is improper and should
be stricken. Rule 23 (k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Significantly, Respondents, do not dispute the long-standing view that in
reviewing the proceedings below and given the scope of the Utah Workers
Compensation Act, the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. E.g.,

State Tax

Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); and
McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 1977).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE
There is no "determinative" Statute or Rule; however, the parties are not in
2

dispute as to the Statutes which have potential "applicable" value.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The relevant facts in this matter are simple, straightforward and are not in
dispute. Respondents have not objected to Petitioner's Statement of Facts, nor
claimed that they are inadequate. Respondent's Statement of Facts, however, is
replete with irrelevant, immaterial and potentially prejudicial material, which
recharacterizes the record in a light relevant to different issues.
SUMMARY OF REPLY
Under long-standing Labor Commission rules and practice, an Applicant for
workers' compensation benefits has had for the past 90 years, an unconditioned
right to withdraw his/her Application for Hearing at any time. No formal Rule of the
Labor Commission prohibits, limits or addresses this right in any way whatsoever.
In order to change this practice, Administrative Rulemaking is required. If a case
decision alters that custom and practice, rulemaking must be initiated in order to
make it universally applicable to all industrial claims.
Further, the ALJ and Labor Commission failed to adequately weigh the
reasons for Petitioner's withdrawal of her Application for Hearing. There was no
basis or justification to dismiss her Application for Hearing with prejudice, the
Commission engaged in inadequate fact finding to support that harsh result, and
there is no indication in the record that the dismissal with prejudice was done as a
sanction.
3

ARGUMENT
I
THE PETITIONER HAD A RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
HER
APPLICATION FOR HEARING AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO HEARING.
A. Long Standing Commission Custom and Practice.
Respondents, without citation or argument, deny that there was ever any
"custom" or "practice" to permit withdrawal of an Application for Hearing. In so doing
they do not even address the precedent of Barton v. St. George Steel. Case No. 970887 (November 29,2000), which interestingly involved the same counsel as appear
in the present case. In Barton, both the ALJ and the Commission upheld the
Applicant's voluntary withdrawal and dismissal without prejudice of his Application
for Hearing during the Hearing and over the objection of the Defendants.
The clear and undisputed fact is that the long course of practice before the
Labor Commission is that an Applicant can and on numerous times has withdrawn
his/her Application for Hearing. Respondents denial of this practice and custom is
done without citation to authority.
The Utah Labor Commission's 2002 opinion in Willard v. Thurston Cable
Construction. Case No. 98-0569, recognizes this practice.

In Willard. the

Commission staff automatically responded to the Notice of Withdrawal by entering
a voluntary dismissal. When the Respondents in that case objected, the ALJ upheld
the dismissal on the basis of "Commission custom permitting applicants to withdraw

4

Applications for Hearing at any time...". |d at 2. Respondent's denial of a "custom"
is disproved in the very case that they cite.
B. Failure to Engage in Rulemaking.
If Willard announced a departure from that long standing custom, it was
inappropriate for such a monumental change and reversal of a long standing
Commission practice and custom to be made by a single Commissioner in a single
case. Labor Commission cases are not indexed and researchable. At present, they
are only published on the Commission's website for a scant six months, after which
they are only available to those who know about them.
It is unknown if Willard in 2004 was published in any form or for how long. If
one tried to research the law on voluntary dismissals, there would be no way to find
the Willard case unless one already knew about it.

In essence, Utah Labor

Commission cases constitute a secret body of law unknown to the public at large.
The Utah Administrative Procedure Act, Utah Code Annotate § 63-46a-3
(2001) provides as follows:
In addition to other rulemaking required by law, each agency shall
make rules when agency action:
(a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action;
(b) provides or prohibits a material benefit;
(c) applies to a class of persons or another agency; and
(d) is explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute.
A decision from the Labor Commission on a Motion for Review is clearly
agency action and the result in Willard required Rulemaking in that it prohibited an
5

action, prohibited a material benefit and it applies to a class of persons (i.e. injured
workers). The Commission failed to initiate Rule Making which this significant
change in workers compensation practice required. Although Petitioner raised this
issue before the Labor Commission in her Motion for Review and Brief on appeal,
neither the Commission nor the Employer/Carrier referenced the failure to comply
with Rule-Making requirements in their Order or in their responses at the
Administrative level.
C. Willard v. Thurston Cable Construction is Inapplicable to This Case.
Respondents failed to respond to any of Petitioner's specific arguments that
Willard is factually and legally distinguishable from this case.
As Petitioner previously argued and Respondents chose not to respond to,
although the ALJ was under no general obligation to do so, she had adopted that
practice and knew that Petitioner's counsel was within 5 minutes of the Hearing
location. Under the circumstances, the failure to even try to contact Petitioner's
counsel was extremely prejudicial and has principally resulted in the situation we
now find the parties in. In contrast with the Willard precedent (to the extent it is any
precedent), Petitioner and her counsel were deprived of the ability to "fully explain
and substantiate the reasons" for the withdrawal.
D. Miscellaneous Points in Respondent's Brief.
Respondents advance six purposed reasons for sustaining the denial of the
Withdrawal of the Application for Hearing.
6

First, Respondents argue that late notice was given and that the Motion had
only been faxed to the Commission on the day of the Hearing. Although the
Respondents speculate that "Judge Marlowe was concerned with the late notice,"1
no significance is attached by them to the alleged "late notice", nor any analysis as
to the required advance notice that should be required. Petitioner has argued that
she could withdraw her Application for Hearing at any time and Labor Commission
precedent supports that on the day of a Hearing and even during the Hearing.2
Second, Respondents allege that no Notice of the withdrawal of the
Application for hearing was sent to Respondents' counsel. This is a specious
argument. Respondents admit that it was a fax failure (apparently caused by their
line being busy) that prevented the Notice from going through. Petitioner's counsel
did all that he could to give notice to Respondents and he was only stymied in doing
so due to their counsel's busy fax line. The Commission and the ALJ certainly
received the Notice and was aware of the withdrawal.
Third, Respondents claim that they incurred a large expense due to the late
notice. This expense is apparently the result of their preparation and travel time to
the Hearing. Petitioner should not be penalized that the employer/carrier chose to
employ counsel who resided hundreds of miles from the required Hearing site. In
addition, withdrawal of the Application for Hearing would have resulted in a dismissal
1

Respondent's Brief at 18.

2

Barton v. St. George Steel. Caste No. 97-0887 (November 29,2000)
7

without prejudice which means that the Respondents had won.

All of their

preparation time and expense was born out by the Application being dismissed.
Although it is possible for such an Application to be refilled, that is a risk
Respondents run in every case, because of the Commission's continuing jurisdiction.
The Respondents' travel expenses were minimal when weighed against the impact
of a dismissal with prejudice to the Applicant, and were partially the result of the
Commission and ALJ's failure to act on the Notice of Withdrawal.
Fourth, Respondents allege that they had a witness available to testify and
that, at the time, the Respondent restaurant would be closing within a month. There
is no indication from the ALJ's Findings that the alleged witness even appeared at
the Hearing or that the ALJ found the witness' testimony important to the claim. The
witness is not identified in the Appearances section of the Decision and her
testimony and the evidentiary value of it is never mentioned in the decision. It also
defies logic and reason that the Respondent insurance carrier could not remain in
contact with their sole witness and preserve some plates. If it was reasonably
expected that the witness would not be available in the future, her deposition could
have been taken to preserve her testimony. Respondents make no allegation that
they no longer have possession of the plates or contact with their witness.
Fifth, Respondents allege that Petitioner has "already been compensated to
the extent allowed by the Worker's Compensation Act for any injuries from this
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accident."3 This is a new argument on appeal and was not included in either the ALJ
decision or that of the Labor Commission. The argument that she was allegedly
"paid everything that she was entitled to", raises a new issue on appeal which cannot
be considered on appeal. Interiors Contracting v. Smith. Halander. 881 P.2d 929
(Utah App. 1994); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799,801-02 (Utah App. 1987); and
Turtle Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah
1982). "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are deemed waived,
precluding [the appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal." Salt Lake
County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989). This rule is "'stringently
applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual questions whose
relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial.'" i d (quoting Booacki v. Board of
Supervisors. 5 Cal.3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 543-44, 97 Cal.Rptr. 657, 663-64 (1971),
cert, denied. 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1301,31 L.Ed.2d 488 (1972)).
Sixth, Respondents place heavy reliance on ALJ Marlowe's Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law; however, it is not her decision that is before this Court, but
rather the decision of the Labor Commission, which did not adopt Judge Marlow's
Findings or Conclusions. It only affirmed her Order of Dismissal with prejudice - but
made specific Findings of Fact on its own. Respondents missed or ignored this
subtle but important distinction.
Seventh, Respondent's objections as to Petitioner's Withdraw are irrelevant
3

Respondent's Brief at 19-20.
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as mere conjecture and speculation. As pointed out above, the Willard decision
requires that the injured worker be given the opportunity to "fully explain and
substantiate the reasons for requesting permission to withdraw."4 This was not done
in this case.
D. Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Appeals Board's reliance on Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
in Willard is misplaced. As the Board noted in that case "Rule 41 (a) [Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure] limits a plaintiffs ability to voluntarily dismiss an action to the time
before an adverse party has filed an answer or other response." The Board went on:
Although the Rules of Civil Produced do not apply per se to
administrative workers' compensation proceedings such as this, it is
appropriate for the Commission to turn to the Rules for guidance in
situations where no other standards are directly applicable and
application of the Rules is not contrary to the spirit or purpose of the
administrative proceeding. Jd. at 2.
The problem with that analysis is that there are, in fact, "other standards
directly applicable." The Administrative Procedures Act does not require a Motion
or the consent of the adverse party or the ALJ for withdrawal of an Application for
Hearing at any point in the proceedings. In fact, as noted by the ALJ in Willard. it is
a long standing "Commission custom" to permit Applicants to withdraw Applications
for Hearing at any time.
In addition, the Utah Labor Commission in its' Order Affirming ALJ's Decisions

4

Willard v. Thurston Cable Construction. 98-0569 (7/29//02).
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specifically concluded thaf'Rule 41, U.R.C.P., although not directly applicable in the
Labor Commission's adjudicative proceedings, provided useful guidance by
analogy." (R. at 209) Thus, the Labor Commission, at best, elevated Rule 41 from
being "useful guidance by analogy" to a new Rule replacing long-standing
Commission custom and practice to the contrary. That the Labor Commission is
reduced to extrapolating "useful guidance by analogy" to overrule long-standing
Commission custom and practice points to the unequivocal and overwhelming need
for the initiation of Administrative Rulemaking.
II
THE LABOR COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THIS
MATTER WITH PREJUDICE.
This case should not have been dismissed with prejudice. Respondents
argue for the first time that such is permitted by Utah Code Annotated, § 34A-2417(4)(b)(ii)(A)(4) (2004) which provides in relevant part that:
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudication may dismiss
a claim:
(i) without prejudice; or
(ii) with prejudice only if:
(A) the Division or Adjudication adjudicates
the merits of the employee's entitlement to
the compensation claimed in the application
for hearing; or
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsection (2)(a)(ii).
First, the problem with this analysis initially is that the statute is cited for the
11

first time by the Respondents on appeal, and further was not argued below by the
Respondents or relied upon by the ALJ or the Labor Commission in either of their
Orders.
Second, this statute conflicts with Utah Code Annotated, Section 34A-2-420,
U.C.A. which specifically provides that:
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case
shall be continuing.
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner,
or Appeals Board in accordance with part 8, Adjudication, may from
time to time modify or change a former finding or order of the
Commission.
The concept of a "dismissal with prejudice." meaning that a case can never again be
revisited again for any reason, is inconsistent with the Commission's statutorily
mandated continuing jurisdiction.
Third, the Labor Commission did not make any Findings as to why the
extraordinary and harsh remedy of a dismissal with prejudice was imposed. The
Labor Commission's Notice of Hearing indicates that if a party fails to appear, the
"case may be dismissed or you may be defaulted," but it does not state that a
dismissal with prejudice could occur at all. (R1 at 30). Petitioner, therefore, was
advised on the Labor Commission's own form of the specific sanctions were she not
to appear, and neither of them involved a dismissal with prejudice. Therefore she
had no way of anticipating such a harsh result.
Fourth, the statute required that the '... merits of the employee's entitlement
12

to compensation claimed in the application for hearing" be adjudicated. The merits
of Mrs. Duran's claim could not be adjudicated in her absence. At best the ALJ
heard from one witness and heard the legal arguments of the Employer/Carrier's
attorney. This falls far short of an adjudication "on the merits".
Fifth, Respondents case law authority are all cases from Courts of general
jurisdiction which neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Labor Commission
are. Respondents cite no authority for their claimed position from any decision
dealing with administrative agencies, generally, or the Labor Commission,
specifically. What authority does exist is directly contrary. For example, the Utah
Court of Appeals in Doubletree v. Industrial Commission. 797 P.2d 464 (Utah App.
1990) held that the Commission had authority under the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act to dismiss "without" prejudice. See also Bourqeous v. Department
of Commerce. 981 P.2d 414 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) and Bacon v. Industrial
Commission. 854 P.2d 548 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).
Sixth, Respondents also argue that not dismissing this case with prejudice
would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. They do not
develop the argument and only refer to it in a single sentence.5 providing no
argument, case citation or legal analysis to support it. Accordingly, there is nothing
to address and that issue should not be considered on appeal.
Associates. Inc. Francis Towns. 977 P.2d 462 (1998).
5

Respondent's Brief at 29.
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Kaiserman

"[Tjhis court is not a

depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998) (quotations and citations
omitted). "[R]ule 24(a)(9) [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires not just
bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis
based on that authority." Jd. It is well established that Utah appellate courts will not
consider claims that are inadequately briefed. See, e.g., State v.Lucero. 2002 UT
App 135,1[ 8, 446, 47 P.3d 107; State v. Marquez. 2002 UT App 127.U 12, 54 P.3d
637.
And finally, Respondents attempt to tar Petitioner's attorney with improper
motives and dilatory conduct, but there is scant evidence for such a claim.
Respondents go far beyond the record in this case to make that tortured claim.
Respondents seek to justify the dismissal with prejudice as a sanction, but neither
the ALJ or the Labor Commission characterized the case in that manner. The
decision of the Labor Commission from which this Petition for Review is taken did
not impose any sanction or make any allegation of improper conduct by Petitioner.
Any contrary claims by Respondents are purely imaginary, argumentative and
without support.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioner was entitled to withdraw her Application hor Hearing at any time
prior to Hearing as she did in this case. Long-standing Labor Commission custom
and practice supports it.

Even if it had been proper to dismiss Petitioner's
14

Application for Hearing, it could only be dismissed without prejudice, which such
relief Petitioner respectfully requests.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2007.
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